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FEATURE ARTICLE
Consumer Myths v. Legal Realities: How
Can Businesses Cope?
By Caroline 0. Shoenberger*

I. Introduction
Should we blame the Bill of Rights for a lot of our daily
consumer problems? Did our founding fathers and great leaders who
followed them err when they created the first ten amendments?
Whether one subscribes to the theory that the Constitution and its
amendments are to be judged on their exact words alone or the school
of thought that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a brilliant,
evolving document,' it is clear that the Bill of Rights still contains ten
amendments.
Ask any law professor or law student about the Bill of Rights
and theq will, by rote response, reel off a few examples: freedom of
speech, the right to due process, 3 the right against selfincrimination,4 and the right to peaceful assembly.5 But, average
* Caroline Shoenberger, M.A., M.B.A., J.D., has served as the Commissioner
of Consumer Services of the City of Chicago for fifteen years. Prior to becoming
commissioner, she served as a supervising attorney for the Cook County State's
Attorney's Office, Consumer Fraud Division, and as Director of the State's
Attorney's Child Support Enforcement Division. Prior to holding these positions,
she served as an assistant attorney general in the Consumer Protection Division of
the Illinois Attorney General's Office. Commissioner Shoenberger has also served
on the Consumer Law Review Advisory Board since the Review's founding in
1990.
Linda Greenhouse, Competing Visions of the Role of the Supreme Court,
CHI. DAILY LAW BULLETIN, July 8, 2002, at 1 (reprinted from the N.Y. TIMES).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3 U.S. CONST.
4 Id.

amend. V.
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consumers have added their own set of rights: the unlimited right to
privacy; the right to return goods and get full refunds; and the right to
a three-day cooling-off period in which contracts can be voided.
These rights represent a few of the best-known examples. Yet, others
exist, such as the right to a discount and the right to park in front of
one's home. But, the point is clear: consumer expectations have
evolved far more quickly than the law, or at a minimum, the Bill of
Rights. These expectations have posed a problem for modem
businesses as well as the consumer.
Since the adoption of the Constitution, the basic goal of
business has been the need to make money. 6 Whether business is forprofit or not-for-profit, the bills must be paid in order to stay alive.
For-profit businesses are even expected to generate profits for their
investors. 7 Most businesses focus on relevant consumer groups:
identifying their best customers; inducing them to part with their
consumer surplus; 8 and ensuring that customers will retain their
business.
Attracting customers involves the art of marketing.9
Regardless of the marketing tactics used, such as "branding,"
"guerilla
marketing,"' 10
"relationship
marketing,""
target
5 U.S. CONST.

6

amend. I.
Interview with Nicholas Lash, Finance Professor, Loyola University

Chicago, School of Business (Mar. 2, 2004). See also 46 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of
Facts § 2 (2003).
7 46 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts at § 2 ("a for profit corporation is
incorporated with a view towards realizing gains that are thereafter to be distributed
to members or shareholders ....).
8 "Consumer surplus is defined as the difference between what consumers are
willing to pay for a unit of the good and the amount consumers actually do pay for
the product." Steven M. Suranovic, InternationalTrade Theory and Policy Lecture
Notes, at http://www.intemationalecon.com/test/ch90/90c080.html (last visited
Mar. 14, 2004).
9 Branding is defined as giving a product "[a] name, term, sign, symbol,
design, or some combination of these, which identifies them as the marketer's and
differentiates
them
from
competitor's
offerings."
See
http://www.fuel4arts.com/sauce/10-glossary/glossary.htm (last visited Mar. 14,
2004).
'oGuerrilla marketing is a marketing strategy created by Jay Conrad Levinson
in 1984. The strategy involves non-traditional, low-cost effective marketing. See
http://www.jayconradlevinson.com (last visited Mar. 14, 2004).
" Relationship marketing is a customer relationship strategy that customizes
products and services to meet the consumer's needs. JIM Novo, DRILLING DowN:
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marketing,"1 2 or "viral marketing," 13 marketers are trying to identify
customers, retain customers, and induce spending. Some hardy
marketers may even be bold enough to try to recruit old customers to
help find new ones.' 5 Whichever tactic marketers use, the goal of
successful marketers is to please their customers. Ignoring or
defrauding customers is bad for business. Marketers involved in
slick, get-rich-quick schemes risk the wrath of law enforcement and
even worse, class actions and personal liability.
The question then becomes, how do businesses cope? This
article will focus on some of the legal basics behind common
consumer myths as well as offer some strategies that businesses may
employ to accommodate such misunderstandings while still enabling
businesses to operate profitably.

II. Consumer Myth: The Right to Unlimited Privacy
A thorough reading of the Bill of Rights reveals the absence
of the word "privacy." Nevertheless, consumers are convinced that
they have an unlimited constitutional right to privacy that includes,
but is not limited to, their home telephone number, home address, and
buying habits.
In analyzing some of these perceptions, a few minor details
have been overlooked. Home addresses, for example, are considered
private.16 However, home addresses are written on the outside of
(Jim Novo ed.,
2002), excerpt available at http://www.booklocker.com/sampledrillingdown.pdf
(last visited Mar. 14, 2004).
12 Permission marketing is a marketing strategy under which the consumer
agrees, or in some cases requests, to receive information about specific areas of
interest. See William C. Taylor, Permission Marketing, FAST COMPANY MAG.,
http://pf.fastcompany.com/
198,
available
at
April
1998,
at
magazine/14/permission.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2004).
13 Viral marketing is also known as "pass it on marketing." See Joyce Slaton,

TURNING CUSTOMER DATA INTO PROFITS WITH A SPREADSHEET

PassIt On, INDUSTRY

STANDARD MAG.,

14 ROBERT CRAVEN ET AL.,

Sept. 25, 2000.

CUSTOMER IS KING:

How

TO EXCEED THEIR

Publishing 2002).
15 This market innovation was allegedly pioneered by Sears, Roebuck, & Co.
See http://www.sears.com/history (last visited Mar. 14, 2004).
16 The ACLU, for example, has argued that even the home addresses of sex
EXPECTATIONS (Virgin

offenders should be private. Michael Symons, Addresses listed Online, JOURNAL
2003),
at
http://www.thejoumalnews.com/
(Sept.
27,
NEWS.COM
newsroom/092703/b0527megan.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2004) (citing a Third
Circuit case that upheld the online publication of such information).
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letters, magazines, and other mail delivered by the United States
Postal Service. Home addresses, and until recently, social security
numbers, are also on drivers' licenses, such as the licenses issued by
the Illinois Secretary of State. 17 Home telephone numbers and home
addresses are included on all credit applications. Home telephone
numbers are routinely given to businesses, government, and other
third parties with the request that the numbers be used to return calls.
If all of this private information is used and given out freely to the
public, how can it be private?
Buying habits are also considered private. Nonetheless,
marketers often make assumptions about consumers based on their
purchases at a grocery store. Do consumers buy dog food, baby food,
beer, wine, or organic food? Consumers now receive grocery store
discounts if they use a special "loyalty" card through which their
purchases can be electronically tracked.18 Department stores target
their sales and promotional material to customers who have
frequented their stores.19 So, how private are these buying habits?
Goods are also bought in public areas of stores. Thus, is it reasonable
to assume that buying habits are private when anyone can see what
consumers are buying?
20
Finally, with the use of computer cookies, and other new
technology, does privacy really exist on the Internet? Consider, for
instance, that an employer can monitor how work-related computer
technology and equipment are being used. 21 An employer can even
check up on how such technological systems are being used from
home.22

17Social Security numbers were removed from Illinois drivers' licenses and
identification cards, starting December 2001. Press Release, Illinois Secretary of
State, Drivers License to Undergo Changes January 1 (Dec. 30, 2002), at
http://www.sos.state.il.us/press/2002/december/021230dl.html (last visited Mar.
14, 2004).
18 Katherine Albrecht, Supermarket Cards: The tip of the retail surveillance

Iceberg, 79 DENV. U. L. REv. 534, 558 (2002).
19See http://www.supermarketpromotions.com/shopper.htm (last visited Mar.
14, 2004) (noting that the hottest marketing efforts are in the supermarket).
20 A cookie is defined as a "text-only string that gets entered into the memory
of your browser." David Whalen, The Unofficial Cookie FAQ, at
http://www.cookiecentral.com/faq/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2004).
21United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
123 S. Ct. 182 (2002).
22 Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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A. Consumer Privacy and the Constitution
The perception of what is and what is not private necessitates
a mention that the word "privacy" does not appear anywhere in the
Bill of Rights. However, it has been suggested that the main thrust of
the Bill of Rights embodies the
heart of privacy, the right to be free
23
from government interference.
United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis
right to be
memorialized the watchword of privacy advocates, "the
24
left alone," in his dissent to Olmstead v. United States:
The makers of our Constitution... conferred, as against the
government, the right to be left alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation
of the Fourth Amendment. 5
The Supreme Court as well as lower courts quoted the
eloquence of this pronouncement on numerous occasions. 21 The most
recent and comprehensive discussions of the right to individual
privacy from government interference have arisen in cases
surrounding birth control and abortion.2 7 In Griswold v. Connecticut,
for example, the Supreme Court declared the right of privacy to be a
fundamental right under the Constitution in a "penumbra" of several
amendments constituting the Bill of Rights. The Court stated,
"[t]hat specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that give them life and

23 The right to privacy first gained currency from a law review article written
by Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890) (Brandeis
later became Justice of the Supreme Court). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
24

277 U.S. 438 (1928).

25 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (discussing obscenity in private
homes); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (police recording of telephone
calls).
27 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
26

28

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
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substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. 29 The
Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade3° further explained the fundamental
right of privacy:
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of
privacy. [But] the Court has recognized that a right of
privacy does exist under the Constitution. In varying
contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed,
found at least the roots of that right in the First
Amendment... in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.

.. in

the penumbras of the Bill of Rights.. .in the Ninth
Amendment or in the concept
of liberty guaranteed [by] the
31
Fourteenth Amendment.
Notwithstanding the strong declarations in these cases, the
assertion that a consumer's right to privacy has been violated is not
sufficient to result in the imposition of a legal remedy. The assertion
must be "reasonable" and the facts of the particular case must be
consistent with the assertion. 32 In other words, there must be a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 33 Such a concePt has arisen in
many cases involving the Fourth Amendment. 3 Generally, an
individual has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the
following
circumstances: (1) as an overnight guest 36in a private
35
home; (2) in his or her use of a public pay telephone; and (3) as a
passenger with personal baggage on a bus. 37 However, other cases
have held that such a reasonable expectation of privacy does not exist

29

Id. at 484.

'0 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31 Id. at 152-53.
32

See McCarthy W. Constructors, Inc. v. Phoenix Resort Corp., 821 P.2d 181,

187 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); U.S.A. Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 821 F.2d 622,
627 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
33 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735 (1979)); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
34 See generally infra notes 35-41.
35
36

Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.

37 Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
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with respect to: (1) property in plain view of the public;3 8 (2)
detection through non-intrusive technology of marijuana growing in a
private home; 39 (3) police checkpoints to4 1 monitor compliance with
n°
immigration laws; and (4) sobriety laws.

As summarized above, the Constitution affords the consumer
minimal privacy protections, which only truly extend to government
intrusions. Even privacy rights against government intrusion will
likely be challenged as a result of the U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001,
enacted after September 11, 2001 .42 The Act authorizes the
government to investigate foreign related
transactions
usingn means
m
Amendments.
Fourth
and
First
the
contradict
that seemingly
While the Bill of Rights creates privacy rights through the
government, what happens in other situations? How are private
parties impacted? Unlike French law, the U.S. Constitution does not
address "private" privacy rights.4 4 Nevertheless, privacy rights
between private parties have been accorded some protections through
common law and by a patchwork of numerous statutes, some of
which are discussed below.
B. Consumer Privacy Rights Based on Common Law and
Statute
In claiming damages incurred as a result of breaching an
individual's right to privacy, the Restatement (Second) of Torts
identifies four causes of action: (1) an unreasonable intrusion upon
the seclusion of another; (2) appropriation of the likeness of another
or the name of another; (3) the public disclosure of private facts; and

38

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).

39 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
40 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
41 Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).

U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). See
also Adam Liptak, In the Name of Security: Americans of Two Minds on Privacy
Rights, CHI. DAILY LAW BULLETIN, P.1, col. 3, Nov. 25, 2002 (reprinted from the
N.Y. TIMEs).
43 See id.
42

44 Article 9 of the French Civil Code was adopted by an Act of Parliament on
July 17, 1970. See http://www.info-france-usa.org/atoz/privacy.asp (last visited
Mar. 14, 2004). The Conseil Constitutionnel incorporated Article 9 into the French
Constitution of 1958 on January 18, 1975.
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(4) publicity that portrays an individual in a false light.45
Although the Restatement enumerates possible causes of
action under the common law right to privacy, individuals attempting
to seek redress under these theories have fared poorly in the courts,
particularly when objecting to the unauthorized use of their personal
data. 46 Three state court cases are worthy of discussion on this issue.
In Shibley v. Time, 47 the plaintiff, a homeowner, sought to
enjoin magazine publishers from distributing lists containing personal
data to direct mail marketing companies without his prior consent.48
The plaintiff claimed that, by doing so, the publishers had
appropriated his personality.49 In denying the plaintiff's assertion of
an invasion of his privacy, the Ohio Superior Court quoted Lamont v.
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 50 an earlier New York case that
observed that, while the receipt of junk mail was annoying, it was
51
still a short trip from the mailbox to the trash can. 51
A similar result occurred in Dwyer v. American Express.52 In
Dwyer, the Illinois Appellate Court denied a claim that the sale or
rental of data concerning the plaintiff's purchase history did not
constitute tortuous appropriation. 5 3 The court ruled that, ". . .a single
random cardholder's name has little or no intrinsic value to
defendants," merchants. 54 The Dwyer court relied extensively on
Shibley in dismissing the claim.55
The Massachusetts Superior Court, however, suggested a

45 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,

§§ 652(B), 652(C), 652(D), 652(E)
(2000); Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (11. App. Ct. 1995) (citing
PROSSER& KEETON ON TORTS, §117 (1984)).
46 Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975); Dwyer, 652
N.E.2d at 1351; Weld v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. CIV. A. 98-0891F, 10 Mass. L.
Rptr. 217, 1999 WL 494114 (Mass. Superior Ct. June 29, 1999).
47 Shibley, 341 N.E.2d at 337.
48

Id. at 338.

49

Id. at 339.

50 Id. (quoting Lamont v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880
(S.D.N.Y. 1967)).

5' Id. at 338 (quoting Lamont, 269 F. Supp. at 880).
52 652 N.E.2d 1351 (I11.App. Ct. 1995).
51 Id. at 1355-56.
54 Id. at 1356.
55 id.
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different result in Weld v. CVS Pharmacy.56 In Weld, a pharmacy had
transmitted lists containing customers' names, addresses, and dates of
birth to marketing companies which had culminated in a direct mail
57
campaign promoting various drug companies and their products.
While all three cases concerned the distribution of personal data, the
court drew a distinction between the legal ramifications involved in
transmitting financial information as opposed to disseminating
medical data.58
As described above, common law causes of action asserting
the breach of a consumer's right to privacy have succeeded far better
in theory than in practice. A similar complaint can also be directed
towards most legislative attempts to enact privacy protection laws.
Over the past forty years, a plethora of statutes have been hailed by
their proponents as significant tools to protect the privacy rights of
the public. Examples of such legislation have included: (1) the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 59 which
recognizes privacy rights with respect to access and disclosure of
student records; (2) the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970
("FCRA"),6 ° which limits access to credit histories and other personal
information; (3) the Tax Reform Act of 1975, 61 which safeguards an
individual's tax returns; (4) the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
("GLBA"), 62 which limits the transmission of personal data to third
parties; (5) the Fair Debt Collection Act of 1977 ("FDCA"), 63 which
protects debtors from harassment; (6) the Driver's Privacy Protection

Weld v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. CIV. A. 98-0897F, 10 Mass. L. Rptr.
217, 1999 WL 494114 (Mass. Superior Ct. June 29, 1999).
57 Weld, 1999 WL 494114, at *2.
56

58 Such a distinction may be becoming less relevant. On August 8, 2002, the
Department of Health and Human Services modified rules issued under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 242(k),
1301, 1395(cc)(a)(1) (West 2004). The modifications permit marketing to health
care consumers without first obtaining their prior consent. See http://www.epic.org
(last visited Mar. 14, 2004); http://www.healthprivacy.org (last visited Mar. 14,
2004).
59 20 U.S.C. § 1232 (1974).
60
61

15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970).
26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1975), amended by Act of Dec. 8, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-

173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
62 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (1998).
63

15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1977).
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Act of 1994,64 which limits the access and dissemination of
information stored by state motor vehicle licensing agencies; (7) the
Do-Not-Call Implementation Act,65 which calls for the creation of a
do-not-call registry restricting telemarketers' ability to call
consumers for purposes of solicitation; and (8) the CAN-SPAM
Act,66 which places limits on marketers sending unsolicited
commercial emails to consumers.
It is ironic that most privacy protection statutes are generally
known more for their exceptions, exemptions, and exclusions than for
their protections. The FDCA, for example, generally excludes
businesses collecting their own debts. 67 The FCRA exempts anyone
alleging a "legitimate business need" for information. 68 The GLBA
requires businesses to send "privacy disclosure" notices to consumers
so they can affirmatively inform businesses if they do not want their
personal data sold to non-related third parties. 69 However, the
consumer basically has no choice about the "sharing" of their data
with related third parties.7 °
Strange as it may seem, the privacy protection law considered
to be one of the most stringent is the Videotape Privacy Protection
Act. 71 This statute was enacted during the aftermath of the
embarrassing disclosure of Judge Robert Bork's personal choice of
videotapes, which enlivened the Senate Hearing on his unsuccessful
nomination to the United States Supreme Court.
Perhaps the most telling feature of U.S. privacy protection
law is the burden placed on the consumer to assert his or her right to
be left alone. Such a system, known as an "opt-out" system, requires
consumers to notify an establishment that the business cannot use,
share or sell their personal data. This system differs dramatically

64 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (1994).
65

Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat.

557 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108 (2003)).
66 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of
2003 (CAN-SPAM Act), Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (2003).
67 15 U.S.C. § 1692(6) (1977).
68

15 U.S.C. § 1681(3) (1970).

69 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (1998).
70

15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(2) (1999).

7! 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988).
72

Dirkes v. Borough of Runnemede, 936 F. Supp. 235, 238 (D.N.J. 1996).
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from an "opt-in" system, required by European Union data protection
laws, which mandates a business to proactively secure a consumer's
permission to use their data.7 3 American businesses as well as the
courts vastly prefer opt-out systems.7 4
Additionally, American businesses frequently do not facilitate
the use of the opt-out system. 7 5 One only has to check most websites
to observe this reality. Assuming that a web site includes a privacy
policy at all, it is probably a couple of "clicks" or web pages away
from the home page, and is written in lengthy legal jargon. The
privacy notices sent out pursuant to the GLBA are another example.
The notices, costing billions of dollars, were usually tucked away
inside of glossy brochures and systematically tossed out as junk mail
76
by the public. Additionally, every business seemed to utilize a
different method in which the consumer could assert his or her
limited privacy rights. The confusion that ensued caused the GLBA
to be even less effective in protecting the rights of consumers than
originally predicted. 7
73 Directive

95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data
and on the free movement
of such data, at
http://www.cdt.org/privacy/eudirective/EUDirective_.html (last visited Mar. 14,
2004).
74 U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1229 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied

sub nom. Competition Policy Institute v. U.S. West, Inc., 530 U.S. 1213 (2000).
75The FCC and FTC recently rejected the opt-out approach for the national
do-not-call registry, which also sustained constitutional attack by the Tenth Circuit.
See Mainstream Mktg. Serv., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004).

Congress, however, adopted the opt-out approach for commercial email in the
CAN-SPAM Act of 2003. See Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (2003).

Comments of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse, US PIRG, and Consumers Union, In re Fin. Serv. Modernization
Act or Gramm-Leach-Biley Act (GLBA) (Department of the Treasury, May 1,
76

2002), availableat http://www.epic.org/privacy/financial/ glbncomments.pdf.
77 Paige Norian, The Struggle to Keep Personal Data Private: Attempts to
Reform Online Privacy and how Congress Should Respond, 52 Cath. U. L. Rev.

803, 828 (2003). Norian states that:
[I]t is alleged that GLBA has not increased financial privacy. For
example, 'the amount of financial data that financial institutions can
collect has increased rapidly' since the bill's enactment. In addition,
most of the information sharing 'is done without the knowledge or
approval of the customers.' This practice is largely attributed to unclear
and unreadable opt-out notices provided by financial institutions."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Businesses, nevertheless, have underestimated consumer
frustration with the steady barrage of unwanted intrusions into their
private lives. Legislative proposals addressing such topics as Spam,
telemarketing, and junk mail continue to be filed at all levels of
government. Ironically, persons seeking privacy from telemarketing
by calls and junk mail have to sign a list to be ignored.78 For
businesses, which rarely endorse additional governmental
involvement, the cost to lobby against these proposals is high.
The price tag to challenge the legality of some of the
proposals that actually become law is even more costly. As recent
unsuccessful challenges to the GLBA and a Washington state antiSpam law will attest, it is also difficult to predict the outcome of a
case. 79 Furthermore, negative press is another ramification to
businesses that ignores public demand to exercise greater control
over their private information and private space. The author of the
adage, who boasted, "there is no such thing as bad press," was never
the subject of an investigative report on the nightly news.
Even potentially more of a drain on the bottom line is the
realization by some enterprising companies that the public desire to
be left alone can form the basis of new business opportunities. 80 The
business of protecting the privacy rights of the public is a growing
industry. 81 New devices such as anti-telemarketing telephone

78

Illinois Telephone Solicitation Act. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.

§ 413/30 (1999),

amended by 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §413/16 (Jan. 1, 2003), available at
(last
http://www.legis.state.il.us/legislation/legisnet92/status/920HB0369.html
visited Mar. 14, 2004). See also Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 67 Fed. Reg. 62667-01 (Oct. 8, 2002)
(to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64); Telemarketing Sales Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 449201 (Jan. 30, 2002) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310).
79 See Trans Union LLC v. FTC, 295 F.3d 42, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2002); State of
Washington v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 413 (Wash. 2001).
http://
at
Technology,
Privacy
Solutions,
80 See
Enterprise
www.zeroknowledge.com (last visited Mar. 14, 2004); Privacy Unlimited, at
http://www.privacy-solutions.com (last visited Mar. 14, 2004); Online Privacy
Alliance, at http://www.privacyalliance.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2004).
81 Whole New Privacy Department Will Have to be Created by Companies,

KIPLINGER PERSONAL FINANCE, Fed. 2003, vol. 57, p. 26. It is estimated that tens
of billions of dollars in e-commerce growth has been forgone as a result of
consumer privacy concerns. A. CAVOUKIAN, ET AL., PRIVACY PAYOFF: How
SUCCESSFUL BUSINESSES BUILD CUSTOMER TRUST (Toronto, McGraw Hill Rerson,
2002). The FTC reported that Americans reported losses of $437 million in 2003
from identify theft and fraud, up 37 percent from 2002. See Reuters, U.S. Tallies
Consumer Fraud Loss at $437 Million, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2004, Pt. A., at 20.
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equipment 82 and privacy protection software 83 have hit the market in
recent years. This new industry will compete head on with companies
seeking to seize, slice, and dice even more personal information to
get that message or product out to the public at any cost. Consumers
need businesses to continue collecting information to develop new
products and improve or discard old ones. Businesses also need to be
able to seek new and creative methods to sell their products to the
public. To accommodate public concerns regarding actual or
perceived privacy rights, businesses must adopt a credible privacy
protection policy.
C. Business Strategy: The Privacy Protection Policy
A privacy protection policy should be easily accessible and in
clear understandable language. Once created, the policy must be
strictly followed. The failure to follow a privacy policy can result in
legal liability involving many legal doctrines, such as: (1) breach of
contract; (2) consumer fraud; and (3) unjust enrichment, to name a
few.
Microsoft's recent experience provides a good model of a bad
example. Microsoft's various Passport programs included strict
privacy and data security guarantees. Unfortunately, for the users of
those programs, and ultimately for Microsoft, those representations
were not followed. As a result of complaints filed by privacy
protection advocates, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
commenced an investigation. 84 The FTC and Microsoft reached a
settlement, imposing dramatic new obligations on Microsoft along
with the prospect of years of oversight by the federal government. 85 It
Identify theft led the list of complaints to the FTC for the fourth year in a row.
Drew Clark, Id Theft Tops Complaint List E-auctions Creep Ahead, NAT'L J. TECH.
DAILY, Jan. 22, 2004.

82 Telephone screening services, also known as "Caller ID," are available
through
most
telecommunications
companies.
See
http://www.junkbusters.com/telemarketing.html

(last visited

Mar.

14,

2004)

(discussing how to reduce the number of junk phone calls received).
83 For a listing of some products, see http://www.epic.org/privacy/tools.html
(last visited Mar. 14, 2004).
84 See Complaint, In re Microsoft Corp. (FTC, 2002) (File No. 012 3240),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/O8/microsoftcmp.pdf (last visited Mar. 18,
2004).

85 Press Release, FrC, Microsoft Settles FTC Charges Alleging False Security
and
Privacy
Promises
(Aug.
8,
2002),
available
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/08/Microsoft.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2004).
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is probably safe to assume that Microsoft would have preferred to
avoid all of the controversy, the additional negative press, and of
course, the unwanted interaction with the government.
Businesses that adopt a credible privacy policy granting the
consumer the right to exercise privacy controls may be surprised at
the public response. Many consumers would willingly allow their
purchases to be tracked if given the choice. Offering discounts to
encourage consumer consent has aided this strategy. 86 Others market
the benefits to obtaining and retaining customer information. A recent
advertising campaign, which stated, "No shirt. No shoes. No service.
No receipt is no problem. We can store your purchasing information
automatically for refunds, exchanges and repairs," attracted a lot of
amusement and attention. 87 Did consumers truly understand that their
personal data could be sold to others and used by the retailer for other
purposes? Nevertheless, creative approaches to the privacy issue can
work so long as the solution is honest, uncomplicated, and
understandable.

III. Consumer Myth: The Right to Return Goods
The right to return goods and receive full refunds represents a
very popular "addition" to the Bill of Rights. Many retail stores in the
U.S. have even encouraged returns from consumers as part of a
marketing strategy. 88 Many stores have return counters or return
desks. Stores also thoughtfully offer to include gift receipts in gift
boxes. Stores like Nordstrom have even incorporated a liberal
return
89
policy into their corporate culture and marketing strategy.
A Roper survey revealed that 85 percent of consumers want their favorite
store to track their purchases so they will be entitled to discounts or free samples.
86

Murray Forester, The Roper Starch Report: An Age of Choice, DISCOUNT STORE
NEWS,
Apr.
17,
2000,
available
at
http://web.ask.com/
web?q=Roper+Starch+Report&o--0&qsrc=0 (last visited Mar. 14, 2004). See also
Margaret Webb Pressler, Playing the Loyalty Game: More retailers Offer
Frequent-Buyer Plans to attract,Keep Customers, WASH. POST, May 30, 1998, at
C01, available at 1998 WL 11583223.
87 See generally http://www.hdtv.net/coupons.cfm?merchant=circuitcity
(last
visited Mar. 14, 2004).
88 Susan Reda, Getting a Handle on Returns, at http://www.stores.org/
archives/dec 98cover.asp (Dec. 1998).
89 ROBERT SPECTOR

& PATRICK D. MCCARTHY, THE NORDSTROM WAY: THE

97 (John Wiley &
Sons,
Inc.,
1995),
available
at
http://www.robertspector.com/
NordWay-extract.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2004).
INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA'S #1 CUSTOMER SERVICE COMPANY
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While U.S. consumers expect and U.S. businesses adopt
liberal return policies, the rest of the world does not necessarily
follow suit.9° Outside of the U.S., the sale of goods is considered to
be a final sale, not a loan. 91 Contrast the experiences of a consumer in
the U.K. and a consumer in the U.S. on December 26th, the day after
Christmas. In the U.K., December 26th is known as Boxing Day, an
official holiday when one brings gifts to friends. 92 In the U.S.,
December 26th is an unofficial holiday when friends bring their gifts
back to the stores.
The right to return, however, is not an absolute legal right.
Some retailers are requiring that goods be returned within a certain
period of time of purchase, include the original packaging, and be
accompanied by a receipt. 93 Returns are expensive to businesses, not
only in direct costs, such as the cost of a missed sale, but also
indirectly in areas such as labor and storage.94
Consumer reaction to such limitations can pose a challenge to
businesses. 95 From a legal point of view, it is important to understand
that there are circumstances in which the customer is right. A brief
review of the legal basis of the right to return can assist in the
development of responses to this issue.

90 In the U.K., for example, some stores may only refund the cost of gifts to
the original purchaser's accounts. See Sarah Sandland, Return to Vendor: How easy
is it to exchange those unwanted Christmas gifts?, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 21,
2003, at 12, available at 2003 WL 69069361.
91 Dreadedpressies, THE MIRROR, Dec. 24, 2003, at 4, available at 2003 WL
70626885.
92 One version of the origin of Boxing Day is that servants were required to
work on Christmas in England long ago. They were given leave to visit their
families on December 26. Each servant was given a box with gifts and a bonus. The
holiday has continued. See http://www.web-holidays.com/boxing (last visited Mar.
14, 2004).
93 Sheryl Harris, Some Stores Making Gift Returns Less Happy, AKRON
BEACON J., Jan. 4, 1998.
94 See National Retail Federation of Stores, Poll underscores importance of
Return Policies, http://www.stores.org/archives/dec98sidebar-l.html (last visited
Mar. 14, 2004).
95 Focus Group Results Presentation, Return Policesfrom the ConsumerPoint
of View, CENTER FOR LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT, UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA RENO
(2000), available at http://www.rlec.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2004).
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A. The Right to Return and the Bill of Rights
Students of the law should not be distressed when the right to
return cannot be found in the Bill of Rights-it is not there. However,
advocates for such a right can indirectly point to circumstances where
the right to have a sale enforced by a court of law has been denied or
modified on constitutional grounds. In Shelley v. Kraemer,96 for
example, the U.S. Supreme Court enjoined the enforcement of two
97
real estate contracts containing race-based restrictive covenants.
The Court ultimately reversed
two state supreme court decisions that
98
provisions.
such
upheld
Similarly, the Supreme Court has also prohibited the
enforcement of state laws permitting pre-judgment garnishment and
attachment of property. 99 These laws permitted private parties to use
government officials to implement such "'creditors' rights."'' 0 The
Court ruled that the laws, which authorized the use of state action
prior to the adjudication of the rights of the parties, violated the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution. 10 ' Notwithstanding the examples
detailed above, in which a constitutional analysis was used to block
efforts to enforce contracts between seemingly private parties, it is
unusual for such challenges to succeed.
B. The Right to Return and the Common Law
The right to return at common law was generally expressed as
"voiding a contract" or "rescission. ' 02 Suits to rescind or void a
96

334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948).

97 Id.

98 Id.

99 Sniadach v. Family Ins. Co., 395 U.S. 337, 350 (1969) (garnishment);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 102 (1972) (repossession); Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 956 (1982) (attachment).
'00 In Lugar, for example, a state clerk issued the attachment writ, and the
county sheriff executed the writ. See Lugar,457 U.S. at 924.
'o' Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 350; Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 102; Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974). See also Lugar, 457 U.S. at 956 (The United
States Supreme Court ruled that damages could be assessed in favor of a private
party who was subjected to pre-judgment attachment of his property under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.).
102 Beach v. Great W. Bank, 692 So. 2d 146, 149 n.5 (Fla. 1997), (citing
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

§ 833 (Enlarged ed. 1887),

for the proposition that common law rescission must first involve tender of the
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contract were generally brought in courts of equity, while actions for
damages were initiated in courts of law.' 0 3 Until the latter half of the
twentieth century, very definite distinctions between actions and
relief could be obtained through cases filed in courts of law and
the same time. 104 The plaintiff
courts of equity, though not both
0 5 at
remedy.'
a
elect
to
was required
In actions for rescission, the chancellor was asked to declare
the contract unenforceable. 106 The rationale would generally be based
upon a claimed procedural defect in the contract. Such defects would
include but not be limited to: (1) lack of capacity; (2) inadequate
consideration; (3) illegality; (4) failure of a condition covered by the
contract to take place; (5) misrepresentation or fraud; and (6) other
problems in the formation of a contract.' 0 7 Courts of equity could also
rescind a contract due to substantive problems, such as
unconscionability. 10 8 Whether relief was sought due to alleged
procedural defects or substantive problems, the reluctance of courts
to grant such petitions can be amply demonstrated.
For example, while a California court ruled that a contract
executed by a minor could be disaffirmed because the minor lacked
the legal capacity to enter into the contract, 10 9 a Florida court refused
to grant rescission to a married woman who also claimed she lacked
the necessary capacity to enter into a contract. 10 The court in Knott v.
Smith noted that the married woman sought rescission while failing to
In
offer to return the consideration received under the contract.
property received before the contract is void.).
103 See Maumell Co. v. Eskola, 865 S.W.2d 272, 273-74 (Ark. 1993)
(rescission in equity). To undo the contract at law, the return of the property
effectuates the rescission and the court merely grants restitution. See Digicorp v.
Ameritech Corp., 662 N.W.2d 652, 668 (Wis. 2003) (option to rescind and void
contract, or affirm contract and sue for damages).
1' Digicorp,662 N.W.2d at 668.
105 id.

'o6 See Waskey v. Thomas, 235 S.E.2d 346, 348 (Va. 1977) (granting

rescission voiding several contracts).
107 See CALAMARI & PERILLO ON

CONTRACTS

(West 1970).

108

Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).

109

Maier v. Harbor Center Land Co., 182 P. 345, 347 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.

1919).
110

Knott v. Smith, 84 So. 660, 661 (Fla. 1920).

...Id. at 663.
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Eibel v. Von Fell, a New Jersey case, the buyers of so-called "New
Homes" could not void the contract because the court found that they
had prior knowledge
of the defects in the homes and thus had ratified
11 2
contract.
the
Another attempt to rescind a contract was thwarted by the
Kansas Supreme Court in Missouri River Ft. S & G.R. Co. v.
Commissionerof Miami County.'l3 The court in Missouri River ruled
that, absent proof of fraud or collusion between a public body
authorized to act on behalf of the population and a private party, the
mere inadequacy of consideration was not sufficient to prevail. 14 The
lack of corporate seals on the contract instrument, sufficient to void
the contract, was not enough to find rescission because the court
could always order the parties to affix their seals. 115 Similarly, a
Wisconsin seller of a diamond worth $1,000 seeking rescission of the
$1 sales contract was also denied relief." 6 The Wisconsin supreme
court was also not sympathetic to attempts to rescind a contract with
a corporation unlicensed in Wisconsin where no attempjt had been
made to return the payments received under the contract.
These cases illustrate the reluctance of judges and chancellors
in many different states and circumstances to rescind contracts
between private parties. The freedom of contract is still alive and
well. Rescission has been possible under extreme circumstances
where fraud could be demonstrated, 118 or where the nature of the
agreement was so one-sided as to shock the conscience. 19

112

Eibel v. Von Fell, 38 A. 201, 202 (N.J. 1897).

113

Missouri River Ft. S. & G.R. Co. v. Comm'r of Miami Co., 12 Kan. 482

(1874).
114

Id. at *4.

115 Id.
116

Wood v. Boyton, 25 N.W. 42, 44 (Wis. 1885).

117

Duluth Music Co. v. Clancy, 120 N.W. 854, 856 (Wis. 1909).

118 PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS

§ 105 (5th ed. 1984).

'19 Am. Home Improvement Co. v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886, 888-89 (N.H.
1964) (unconscionable provisions in long printed contracts need not be enforced);
Jackson v. Seymour, 71 S.E.2d 181, 184-86 (Va. 1952) (where inadequacy of price
shocks the conscience, it is indicative of fraud; when fraud occurs, contract can be
rescinded); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 97 (N.J. 1960)

(disclaimer of implied warranty of merchantability violates public policy and is
void where defective steering system resulted in accident for car having only 461

miles on it).
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C. The Right to Return Based on the Uniform Commercial Code
Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC" or
"Code") 20 significantly altered the right to rescission.1 21 While not
precisely codifying a right to return, or in legal parlance, the right to
rescission, the UCC contains numerous provisions that could be used
to justify rescission of a contract, and in some cases, allow a contract
to be revoked as well as allow a party's request for damages. 122 A
brief overview illustrates this point.
The guiding mission of the UCC promotes the principle of
freedom of contract.12 3 However, such a right is not absolute. The
Code also incorporates absolute conditions on this freedom, such as
good faith and reasonableness. 24 The UCC was crafted to simplify,
clarify, and modernize the existing law as well as to encourage the
2 5
continued expansion of commercial law through existing practices.1
Flexibility in construing the Code's substantive provisions, also
known as "liberal construction," was underscored.126 Even the
remedies provided by the Code are required to be liberally
construed.
The UCC eliminates the distinction between relief obtainable
at law and at equity. Under the UCC, a buyer's ability to return goods
has been enhanced, but still does not create an unlimited right. It
should also be noted that the requirements of reasonableness and
good faith
extend to the buyers of goods in addition to the sellers of
128
goods.

120

See U.C.C.

§ 2-608 (2001) (Official Comment 1). The UCC has been

adopted by the legislatures of all states except Louisiana. See Mathis v. Exxon
Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 455 n.6 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Pennzoil Col. v. F.E.R.C., 789
F.2d 1128, 1142 (5th Cir. 1986)).
121

U.C.C. § 1-102 (2001).

122

See U.C.C. 88 1-101, 2-719(3), 2-714 (2001).

123

U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (2001) (The UCC's underlying purpose is to promote

expansion of commercial practices, modernize, and make laws uniform).
124

U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (2001).

'25

U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (2001).

126

U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (2001).

127

U.C.C. § 1-106 (2001).

Section 1-203 of the UCC requires the buyer to exercise good faith and
imposes an obligation of good faith on the performance or enforcement of every
contract. U.C.C. § 1-203. See also Glenn Distrib. Corp. v. Carlisle Plastics, 297
128
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The UCC provisions governing warranties, unconscionable
contract provisions, and contract breaches have facilitated the return
of goods under certain circumstances. While sellers may attempt to
include waivers of such warranties in their contracts, the Code places
limitations on such provisions. 129 The UCC warranty provisions
define express and implied warranties. Express warranties are created
by a seller's conduct during the process of making the sale. 13° Oral
statements or visual representations regarding the attributes or
qualities of a product can create express warranties.131 Likewise, an
express warranty can be created by the appearance of the product, a
sample of the product, or even a picture or brochure associated with
the product. 132For example, a certificate of mileage, displayed on 33
a
used car at the time of sale, was held to34create an express warranty.'
Express warranties cannot be waived.
Unlike express warranties, the two types of implied
warranties included in the Code might be waived by the buyer.135 The
first implied warranty, the implied warranty of merchantability,
extends to purchases of goods from business people who generally
sell that type of product.' 36 The second type of implied warranty, the
implied warranty of fitness, is created when a seller, not necessarily a
business person, is aware of the buyer's purpose in making the
purchase.1 37 The implied warranty of fitness is broader, but more
difficult to prove than the implied warranty of merchantability. 38 As
F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing reasonableness in the context of cover).
129 For example, waivers of rights to object to the commercial reasonableness
of disposition of collateral are invalid under the UCC. See Tropical Jewelers v.
NationsBank N.A., 781 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing
Article 9 of the UCC).
130 U.C.C. § 2-313 (2001).
131 Id.
132

U.C.C. § 2-313 (1)(c) (2001).

133

Rogers v. Crest Motors, Inc., 516 P.2d 445 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973).

"3 U.C.C. § 2-313 (2001) (Official Comments 1, 4); U.C.C. § 2-316(1)

(2001).
135

U.C.C. § 2-316 (2001).

136

U.C.C. § 2-314 (2001).

U.C.C. § 2-315 (2001).
131 Compare U.C.C. § 2-315 (implied warranties of fitness for a particular
purpose) with U.C.C. § 2-314 (implied warranty of merchantability). Substantial
evidence is required to prove implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
137
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indicated, the seller does not have to engage in business. However, if
the seller is aware of the buyer's reason for buying certain goods, a
warranty of fitness may be breached even if the goods, which may be
perfectly acceptable goods, still do not conform to the buyer's
specified reason for the purchase.' 39
These warranties, if not waived, may assist consumers in
returning goods that may be defective or otherwise not meet their
expectations. Even where such warranties have been waived, the
unconscionability provision of the Code may provide relief to buyers
under circumstances in which the goods are neither defective nor fail
to conform to their expectations.14 0 Such provisions have enabled
parties and the courts to reform in whole or in part contracts that are
patently unfair or oppressive to one party. For example, in Williams
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, Inc., 1 a contract that provided the
seller with a continuous security interest in everything the poorly
educated consumer had ever purchased from the seller, was deemed
unconscionable. 142 The implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose requires reliance. 143
In spite of the innovation of this provision, its applicability to
the everyday consumer is somewhat limited.' 44 Short of filing a
lawsuit seeking an order rescinding the contract, consumers are
generally unlikely to persuade sellers to accept the return of some
goods for a refund using such a rationale.
It is more likely that an assertion that the contract or one of
the warranties created under the contract have been breached would
yield greater success. In such instances, the Code authorizes
numerous remedies, including revocation of acceptance. 45 Unlike
common law, the Code allows buyers to accept part of the delivery

Doe v. Miles, Inc., No. ED 75100, 2000 WL 667383, *7 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
139 U.C.C. § 2-3-15 (Official Comment 2).
U.C.C. §§ 2-302, 2-719 (2001). For example, the New York Supreme
Court held that the sale of a $300 freezer for $1.234.80, including credit charges,
insurance and sales tax, unconscionable. Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d
264, 266-68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
141Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
140

142Id. at 449.
143 U.C.C. § 2-315.
'A See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2001) (Official Comments).
145See, e.g. U.C.C. §§ 2-711, 2-601, 2-608 (2001).
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and reject the rest. 146 Buyers are no longer required to elect to bring
an action in equity or in law.
While the UCC has incorporated greater flexibility into
commerce and commercial transactions, an unlimited right to return
has still not been created. On the contrary, there must still be a
lack of such a
reasonable basis to justify a return. Indeed, the 147
reasonable basis may prove very costly to the buyer.
It should also be briefly noted that other statutes also facilitate
the rescission of contracts. For example, many states have enacted
consumer protection statutes known as "Little FTC Acts," 148 based
upon Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTCA"). 149
Unlike the requirement for proving the tort of fraud at common law,
such statutes do not require proof that the seller intended to defraud
the victim.

150

Reliance on the seller's misrepresentations has been

151
deemed sufficient to prove that such statutes have been violated.
Those statutes frequently provide for a private right of action to seek
damages as well as equitable remedies under certain
circumstances.1
Governmental entities may seek equitable
remedies, including restitution and revocation. 5 However, those
laws, like the UCC, do not create unlimited rights. Reasonable facts
justifying the revocation of the contract must still be alleged and

146

U.C.C. § 2-601 (2001); Young v. Roberts, No. 87-1407-C, 1989 WL

149060, *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 1, 1989) (election of remedies doctrine doesn't bar other
applicable UCC remedies).
147 U.C.C. §§ 2-707, 2-708, 2-709, 2-710 (2001).
148

Cel Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular, 973 P.2d 527, 550

n.2 (Cal. 1999).
149 All 50 states have adopted a version of the Little FTC Acts. See, e.g., 815

§ 505/1 (West 2004).
See Falcon Assoc., Inc. v. Cox, 699 N.E.2d 203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); Rubin

ILL. COMP. STAT.
150

v. Marshall Field & Co., 597 N.E.2d 688 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Warren v. LeMay,
491 N.E.2d 464 (I11.
App. Ct. 1986); American Buyers Club, Inc. v. Honecker, 361
N.E.2d 1370 (111. App. Ct. 1977).
151 Hoke v. Beck, 587 N.E.2d 4 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992).
152

See American Buyers Club v. Hayes, 361 N.E.2d 1383 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977);

Honecker, 361 N.E.2d at 1370.
2003)
153 Allen v. Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 752, 755 (I11.
(injunctive relief, restitution, and civil penalties); People ex rel. Daley v. Datacom
App. Ct. 1988) (revocation) (Caroline
Systems Corp., 531 N.E.2d 839 (Ill.
Shoenberger, inter alia, of counsel and argued).
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demonstrated.154 Unless the government is enforcing these laws,155 an
individual seeking equitable relief must still demonstrate
that the
156
requirements for obtaining such relief have been met.
D. Business Strategies to Cope with the Right to Return
The right to return goods, while not part of the Bill of Rights,
does exist in a limited form. Nevertheless, consumer expectations far
exceed the limitations imposed by law. Such expectations should not
be ignored for commercial or human relations reasons. A business
does not want to chase off customers, but recognizing an unlimited
right to return goods can break the bank. Consequently, creating a
strategy for coping is necessary.
The best coping strategies involve a minimum of three
components: (1) creating a return policy that includes dates, times,
places, and conditions; (2) training personnel to understand and
implement the policy; and (3) communicating the policy to
customers. Written policies are best but must be followed.
By creating a written policy, both the consumer and the seller
know the rules. The consumer can then decide if he or she would like
to engage in business with the seller. The seller would be bound
under contract law and other consumer laws to adhere to the written
policy. Businesses generally express concerns about creating written
policies of any kind for just these reasons. Many businesses prefer the
oral "I know it when I see it" policy. Oral policies, however, yield to
confusion, misunderstanding, and angry customers. Worse yet is the
possibility that a court or a human relations commission will decide
the issue. On the other hand, written policies can be a business' best
friend. Businesses can always make exceptions to the written policy
so long as those exceptions are not based upon race, religion, gender,
and other prohibited classifications.
The policy should also be comprehensive and clear, yet
simple and understandable. At a minimum, the policy should contain
the time period when items can be returned, where the items should
be returned, and if original packaging or original price tags must be
included. If a business were located in a multi-ethnic area, sensitivity
154 Freedman Oldsmobile Mazda Co. v. Pinson, 580 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1979).
155 Village of Riverdale v. Allied Waste Transp., Inc., 777 N.E.2d 684 (111.
App. Ct. 2002); People ex rel. Hartigan v. Stianos, 475 N.E.2d 1024 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985).
156 Nations Credit v. Pheanis, 656 N.E.2d 998 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
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to the dominant language of one's customers would always be
appreciated. However, marketing folklore warns against misguided,
but well-intended translations, such as the invitation to "take
advantage" of the sales staff. 57 Therefore, the translation must be
carefully executed.
Once a written policy has been drafted, training should be
conducted for the employees. It is impressive to customers to be able
to ask a question of any store employee, including employees who
generally do not transact business with the public, and get a good
answer. The shopping "experience" should not be a collection of
mumbles and shrugs.
Finally, communication of the policy should be constant.
Businesses should put the message on sales receipts, gift receipts,
marketing brochures, and billing statements. This task can be done
tastefully, and as a way to differentiate one business from another.
Finally, when a customer still insists on his or her right to
return, notwithstanding the written policy, good communication of
the policy, and the trained and helpful staff, businesses should
designate an employee or employees trained to tactfully talk with the
irate customer. These discussions should be private. The business is
to sell, not to put on a show. Sometimes, graciousness resolves
complaints.

IV. Consumer Myth: The Right to a Cooling-Off
Period
The right to a cooling-off period is actually a corollary of the
right to return. Generally associated with door-to-door or highpressure sales with respect to a residence, a consumer is able under
this perceived right to cancel a contract and receive a refund of any
down payment. Like the right to return, there is a limited legal basis
for the perception that a right exists. However, the perception,
particularly with the sale of automobiles, is far more expansive than
the law requires, and particularly in regard to automobiles, frequently
wrong.
Regarding the purchase of an automobile, somewhere along
the line, someone decided that a consumer could: (1) trade in a car;
(2) sign a contract for a new one; (3) drive the car off the lot; and
157

The classic marketing mistake was advertising a Chevrolet Nova in

Spanish-speaking countries. The phrase "no va" means "doesn't go" in Spanish.
See Skipping Stones, Spanish Ole', at http://www.skippingstones.org/canvasvo1154-page3O.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2004).
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then (4) cool off; (5) return the new car; and (6) receive a refund,
complete with the old traded-in car. Chances are, however, that the
moment the dealer received the traded-in car, it was sold for parts and
immediately dismantled or just as quickly, sold to someone else.
Allowing someone the right to cancel a deal can amount to an
elevated art of diplomacy. So prevalent is this myth that in the
summer of 2002, a proposed ordinance was introduced into the
Chicago City Council that sought to extend the non-existent, threeday cooling-off period for senior citizens to 30 days. 5 8 Still, a limited
right to cancel a contract does exist. A cooling-off period is an
important tool in instances when consumers are pressured into
signing contracts or in cases of elderly consumers who may be easily
influenced.
A. The Evolution of the Right to a Cooling-Off Period
First, to set the record straight, the most optimistic reading of
the Constitution fails to reveal the basis for the so-called right to a
cooling-off period. Nor is there a basis in common law, or in the
UCC for a consumer to exercise such a right. As indicated earlier, it
is very difficult to rescind a contract at common law or pursuant to
the UCC, even when a claim of fraud is alleged.' 59
However, there are circumstances, created by either
legislation or through rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to a
legislative grant of authority, under which a limited right to a cooling
off period exists. Examples of statutes and regulations creating a right
to cancel a contract for any reason within a short period of time can
be found in: (1) the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act ("TILA"); 160 (2)
the FTC Trade Regulation Rule Concerning a Cooling-off Period for
61
Door-to-Door Sales ("FTC Three-Day Cooling-Off Period Rule");'
(3) state consumer protection statutes such as the Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practice Act ("ICFA" or "Little FTC
Act"); 62 and (4) other statutes conferring special protections on a
segment of the public, such as the Illinois Public Insurance Adjusters

158 The

proposed ordinance was never set for hearing.

159 Fraud

is always an available cause of action under the UCC. See, e.g.,

U.C.C. § 2-202 (2001) (Official Comments).
'60

15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2003).

161 16
162

C.F.R. § 429 (2004).

815 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 505/1 (West 2004).
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and Registered Firms Act ("IPIARFA"), 163 and the City of Chicago's
Immigration Assistance Ordinance.' 64 Some of these statutes, such as
the IPIARFA,
even provide a consumer with more than three days to
165
cool off.

Many of these laws and regulations have significant legal
limitations or are very narrow in scope. For example, the duty to
provide oral and written notices of a three-day right to rescind a
contract under TILA 166 only arises when67a security interest is taken
by a creditor in the residence of a debtor.'
Additionally, the FTC Three-Day Cooling-off Period Rule
does not contain a private right of action.
Only the FTC can
enforce the rule.' 69 The rule itself requires sellers to provide notice
and forms to consumers detailing their right to cancel contracts
within three business days of execution when the contracts have been
signed outside of the sellers' place of business. 70 The scope of the
rule has been interpreted to extend beyond those contracts signed in
residences to also cover
7' transactions executed in temporary business
motels.'
like
locations
163215 ILL. COMP. STAT.

§ 5/512.51 (West 2004).

164 CHICAGO ILL. MUNICIPAL CODE,
165See

ch. 4-372 (2003).

215 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/5 12.58 (West 2004) (Providing that notice

must be given within 5 days of the event, and the consumer has 10 days to rescind).
166 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (West 2004).
167 Federal

Reserve System Truth in Lending Regulations, 12 C.F.R. §

226.1 (b) (2003).
168 See FTC Advisory Opinion (July 16, 1976). "Since there is no private right
of action to enforce this FTC regulation, however, much of the litigation in this
area is brought under state laws that also mandate cooling-off periods." MARY DEE
PRIDGEN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW § 1.8, at *1 (Thompson West 1986).
169 See, e.g., Baum v. Great W. Cities, Inc., 703 F.2d 119 (10th Cir. 1985); see
also Fulton v. Hecht, 580 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981
(1979). "The whole issue may have become moot because so many state unfair and
deceptive practices acts authorize private actions, often with treble damages and
attorneys fees. Most of these states statutes also incorporate by reference the FTC
law of unfair and deceptive practices, so that consumers have an effective remedy
in state court for violations of the FTC Act. The need for a direct private action to

enforce the FTC Act is no longer so urgent."

MARY DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER

12.41, 921-22 (West 2003).
170 FTC Rule Concerning Cooling-Off Period for sales made at Homes or at

PROTECTION AND THE LAW §

certain other Locations, 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (West 2004).
"' 16 C.F.R. §429.0 (covers hotels or motel rooms, convention centers,
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Broader protection is afforded to the consumer under the
17 2
ICFA or the Little FTC Act, modeled after the FTCA.
Additionally, the Chicago Municipal Code broadly incorporates state
and federal laws and rules. 173 The ICFA's provision relating to the
three-day cooling-off period resembles the FTC Three-Day CoolingOff Period Rule. 174 Unlike the FTC rule, the ICFA permits a private
right of action authorizing the award of actual damages and other
relief, 75 as well as very broad enforcement by the Illinois Attorney
General and the States Attorneys Office for all 102 counties within
Illinois.
The ICFA also differs from its federal counterpart in that it
involves a sale of at least $25 under a single contract or multiple
76
contracts by a seller physically located in a consumer's residence.1
There are numerous exceptions to this law, but none so abused as the
provision permitting the waiver of this right under "emergency"
situations.
The law fails to provide guidelines as to what can be
regarded as an emergency, leading to a lot of unusual emergencies in
Illinois.
Other statutes creating a cooling-off period have been enacted
in Illinois, including, but not limited to: (1) the Illinois Job Referral
and Job Listing Services Consumer Protection Act,1 78 which seeks to
protect job-hunters from employment referral agencies; and (2) the
179
Illinois Public Insurance Adjusters and Registered Firms Act,
which involves non-attorneys whose service are offered to victims of
a "loss-producing occurrence."'1 80 These statutes are narrowly drawn
and address special situations that warrant additional legal protection.
The Chicago Immigration Assistance Ordinance was also created 8 to
address the protection of immigrants from fraud by non-attorneys.' '
fairgrounds, restaurants or sales at the buyer's workplace, or in dormitory lounges).
172815 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 505/1-12 (2003).
173CHICAGO ILL. MUNICIPAL CODE, ch. 2-24-060 (1998).
174 See

supra note 168 and accompanying text.

175815 ILL. COMP.STAT.

§ 505/10a (2003).

176 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.

§ 505/2B (2003).

177

815

ILL. COMP. STAT.

§ 505/213(c) (2003).

178 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.

§ 630/8 (2003).

179215 ILL. COMP. STAT.

§ 5/512.58 (2003).
§ 5/512.58-61 (2003).

'80

215 ILL. COMP. STAT.

181 CHICAGO ILL. MUNICIPAL CODE,

ch. 4-372-010, 030 (1998).
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B. The Inability to Use the Cooling-Off Period as a Weapon
Against Fraud
The real story behind the cooling-off period, when it does
exist in the law, is that it is generally ineffective against fraud. Take,
for example, a door-to-door salesman for a roofing company, after
signing a contract containing the legal cancellation notice, obtains a
$300 down payment. Even if the resident exercises the right to the
three-day cooling-off period, it's a challenge for the consumer to get
back the deposit. When civil cases are filed, assuming appropriate
service has been completed, the cost of collecting a judgment can
exceed the amount of obtaining the actual judgment, not to mention
the cost of the time spent pursuing the collection effort. Government
intervention aided by news exposure may provide victims with
assistance after the fact. However, criminal prosecutions are rare.
Civil actions by the government also require substantial collection
efforts.
Attempts to educate consumers on their right to a cooling-off
period to avoid becoming victims of fraud have also been ineffective.
Government agencies and advocacy groups have tried to educate
consumers on their rights for years. Some consumer protection
agencies have tried to simplify the message: avoid doing business
with door-to-door salesmen and their modern day clones-the
telemarketers and spammers.1 82 Unfortunately, when it comes to
reaching out to consumers, the marketers are the pros, and the buyers
are the amateurs. The tactic continues to produce a lot of revenue,
much of it fraudulently obtained. 183 Statutory attempts to limit direct
access to the public frequently run8 afoul
of the First Amendment and
4
scrutiny.1
judicial
withstand
not
do
Where legitimate companies appropriately present a legally
proper notice of the cooling-off period, the actual language in the
notice is generally written in such a complicated manner that most

182

See http://www.ci.chi.il.us/ConsumerServices/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2004).

The FTC reports that $400 million in consumer fraud was reported in 2002.
Internet fraud represents 55% of the total complaints, phone fraud is among the
most commonly reported. See Peter Lewis, Seattle fraud score a shocker: metro
area ranks No. 2 on FTC list of complaintsfiled, SEAttLE TIMES, Jan 23, 2004, at
B3.
183

184 See, e.g., Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of New York, Inc. v. Village
of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (declaring village ordinances requiring solicitors
to obtain permits before engaging in door-to-door solicitation unconstitutional, in
violation of First Amendment protections).
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consumers rarely look at it. What consumer has the time to actually
read through the notice, especially those heavy in legal jargon and
presented with other documents?
C. Business Strategies to Cope with the Right to a Cooling-Off
Period
In light of the limited existence of a cooling-off period and its
minimal impact when it does exist, the question becomes: why
should businesses have to cope with this consumer myth at all? They
just have to provide the notice when required, as required, and sit
tight. Where the right does not legally exist, they just make the sale
and move on to the next one.
Unless a business is not dependant on return customers, after
market follow up business or good will, a policy for accommodating
the irate customer convinced of his or her non-existent right to a
cooling-off period is essential. Some businesses have even found a
way to improve sales by offering other forms of a cooling-off period,
even when not legally required to do so. For example, a car
85
dealership may allow a customer to return the newly purchased car'
or take advantage of the recently popular twenty-four hour test drive.
Unlike the need to have a formal written policy regarding the
right to return goods, a case-by-case accommodation of the coolingoff period myth may be more prudent, assuming again that the law
does not require it. Decisions made on race, religion, sex, and other
such bases are off limits. Bait and switch tactics should also be
avoided. Each advertisement for the sale of an automobile, or any
other good or service, should be the main course and not an appetizer.

V. Conclusion
The expectations of consumers regarding what they perceive
as their "rights" differ in reality from the protections of the law. As
discussed above, many of these perceptions have some basis in the
law, but have exceeded legal parameters in the minds of the public
and grown to mythical proportions. Other protections are unavailable
outside costly litigation. Nevertheless, to retain public confidence and
avoid unwanted government interference, litigation, and media
attention, consumer expectations should still be addressed. More laws
and bad press carry a price tag.

185 See,

e.g., http://www.carmax.com (last visited Mar. 14, 2004).

